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FEMINISM AS LIBERALISM: A TRIBUTE TO
THE WORK OF MARTHA NUSSBAUM
TRACY E. HIGGINS*
It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this symposium
organized to honor the work of Professor Martha Nussbaum. In her
scholarship, Professor Nussbaum has accomplished over and over again
something that is altogether too rare in the academy; she manages
simultaneously to take seriously both theory and the material conditions of
people's lives, producing work that is both rigorous and relevant. Her
scholarship has long informed my own both in feminist legal theory and in
human rights advocacy, helping me to bridge the gap between theory and
practice. For this reason, I am especially grateful for the opportunity to
participate in this symposium.
In this essay, I revisit and expand an argument I have made with
respect to the limited usefulness of liberalism in defining an agenda for
guaranteeing women's rights and improving women's conditions. After
laying out this case, I discuss Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach to
fundamental rights and human development and acknowledge that her
approach addresses to a significant degree many of the objections I and
other feminist scholars have raised. I then turn to fieldwork that I have done
in South Africa on the issue of custom and women's choices with regard to
marriage and divorce. Applying Professor Nussbaum's capabilities
approach in this setting, I speculate as to the types of regulatory schemes
that would be either demanded or tolerated by her approach. In the final part
of the essay, I suggest that the capabilities approach offers a powerful
means of specifying the preconditions for women's exercise of autonomy
within the liberal state but that it proves somewhat less useful as a guide to
policy choices under conditions that fall far short of this ideal.
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, Co-Director, Leitner Center for
International Law and Justice.
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law
I. FEMINISM AND LIBERALISM
A. Feminist Critiques
Liberalism's core idea is a simultaneous commitment to equal
citizenship in the public realm and the accommodation of competing
conceptions of the good in the private realm. Liberals surely disagree about
precisely where the boundary between public and private should be drawn
and about how robust our conceptions of freedom and equality must be in
the public realm. But for a theory to be recognizable as "liberal," I suggest,
this basic idea has got to be there. For example, John Rawls, in the
introduction to Political Liberalism, states that "the problem of political
liberalism is: How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and
just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable
though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?"'
Similarly, for Martha Nussbaum liberalism "must respect and promote the
liberty of choice, and it must respect and promote the equal worth of
persons as choosers." 2
Feminist legal theorists, responding to liberalism, ask a different
question: Can liberalism sustain a concept of equality that is sufficiently
robust to eliminate women's subordination in both the public and private
domains? Of course, feminists disagree on the answer. 3 Yet even feminist
fans of liberalism concede that feminists have elaborated at least two key
ideas that, at a minimum, call into question the usefulness of liberalism to
I JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvii (1993).
2 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 57 (1999) [hereinafter
NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE].
3 Compare WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 142 (1995) (arguing that "liberalism is premised on and perpetuates a sexual
division of labor, the actual powers of which are obscured by the terms of liberal discourse"),
and CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 216 (1989)
(articulating the inherent tension in liberal definitions of equality as sameness and gender as
difference), and CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988) (arguing that the social
contract upon which liberalism is premised is inextricably linked to the sexual contract of the
patriarchal nuclear family), with Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism,
Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 (1992) (defending a
liberal connection of autonomy against various feminist critiques), and NUSSBAUM, SEX AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 55-80 (critiquing the feminist critique of liberalism), and
Susan Moller Okin, Humanist Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 39-53
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (articulating a liberalism that might accommodate some of
the concerns of feminist critics).
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feminist objectives. 4 First, feminists have argued repeatedly and, to my
mind, persuasively that private power is at least as significant a threat to
women's freedom as is state power. Here, consider power as it is wielded
within the patriarchal nuclear family or within broader community
structures such as religious institutions. Second, feminists have argued that
the centrality of choice to liberal conceptions of freedom is problematic in
view of the implications of gender subordination to women's exercise of
choice.5 I shall describe each of these ideas briefly and then explore their
implications for Nussbaum's conception of human capabilities as a means
of articulating core political commitments.
First, with respect to the public/private distinction, feminists have
argued that the exercise of private power threatens women's liberty and
equality, regardless of whether it mimics the exercise of power by the state.
Indeed, accepting provisionally the liberal distinction between public and
private power, feminists have argued that the latter constitutes the principal
threat to women's liberty and equality.6 For example, some have claimed
that international human rights standards forbidding torture but placing
domestic violence outside the scope of international concern fail to address
the central source of violent coercion in women's lives on a global scale.7
The argument is not that the abusive husband acts under color of state law
or to promote the interests of the state8 but that a meaningful right to
4 See NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 55-80. Defending
liberalism against feminist critiques, Nussbaum frames them somewhat differently than I do
here, focusing primarily on feminist claims that liberalism is both too individualistic and to
rational, paying too little attention to care and emotions. Id.
5 On all this, see text accompanying notes 6-24, infra.
6 Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon argues that private not state power serves as the
foundation to women's inequality:
Unlike the ways in which men systematically enslave, violate,
dehumanize, and exterminate other men, expressing political inequalities
among men, men's forms of dominance over women have been
accomplished socially as well as economically, prior to the operation of
law, without express state acts, often in intimate contexts, as everyday
life.
MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 161.
7 See, e.g., Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist
Perspective, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
11, 15 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
8 However, private violence may function in these ways. See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY
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freedom, bodily integrity, and security for women must include effective
remedies against private violence. 9 Feminists have made similar arguments
in many other contexts, ranging from pornography's silencing of women's
speech' o to the regulatory effects of stranger-violence on women's lives."
Although women are surely protected in many respects by constraints on
public power, these protections do not afford women the same degree of
liberty and equality as men, nor do they address some of the most profound
obstacles to equal citizenship for women.12
Second, feminists have done a lot of thinking about the way
patriarchy creates gendered capacities for individual agency. Recognizing
that the exercise of individual choice is always constrained by culture and
context, feminists have argued that under conditions of gender inequality,
assumptions about choice and responsibility are not politically neutral. This
critique has at least two distinct but related strands. The first and earlier
strand emphasizes women's position in various social relationships-
women as providers of care.' 3 According to this critique, liberal notions of
LECTURES 83, 89 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993) (describing mass rape of
Muslim and Croatian women by Serbian forces in the early 1990s). And, of course, placing
emphasis on the regulatory effects of private violence is not meant to suggest that the state is
not implicated in such violence. Feminists have long argued that the state is complicit in
structuring the exercise of power in the private sphere in myriad ways. See, e.g., Frances E.
Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 835 (1985).
9 See Bunch, supra note 7, at 13-14 (arguing that states must be held accountable
for sustaining conditions that enhance women's vulnerability to private violence).
10 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 157-58 (1987) (noting that the Constitution's approach to free speech "tends
to presuppose that whole segments of the population are not systematically silenced socially,
prior to government action").
11 See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 58-65 (1994) (using the marital rape exemption to argue for
an interpretation of equal protection as targeting the denial of the state's protection to some
of its citizens from private violence, aggression, and wrongdoing).
12 1 have written about this subject in the context of women's equal citizenship and
its implications for the exercise of judicial review. Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and
Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657 (1997) (applying the argument about private violence to
an analysis of equal citizenship for women).
13 Much of this work was influenced by the enormously important early work of
the feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan on the implications of gender for perceived
differences in women's moral reasoning. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) For examples of feminist
legal theory, see Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
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autonomy posit an unrealistically unencumbered individual or "atomistic
man."' 4 Beginning from this conception of liberal autonomy, some
feminists have argued that liberalism undervalues care and connection and,
as a result, is distinctly masculine in its orientation.' 5 Others, Susan Moller
Okin and Linda McClain, for example, have defended Rawlsian liberalism
against such critiques, insisting that Rawls's use of the heuristic device of
the "veil of ignorance" compels the exercise of empathy in the original
position.
16
Yet their defense does not respond fully to a more important
relational feminist claim: that, by positing the self as unencumbered or
atomistic, liberalism treats the work of caring as a voluntarily-assumed,
private activity' 7 and, in so doing, renders it invisible.' 8 This move, some
feminists have argued, is convenient or even necessary for liberalism. As
Wendy Brown explains, "the autonomous subject of liberalism requires a
large population of nonautonomous subjects, a population that generates,
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987)
[hereinafter West, Hedonic Lives]; Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1988) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence].
14 See generally West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 13; West, Jurisprudence, supra
note 13.
15 See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other, in
FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell
eds., 1987); West, 'Hedonic Lives', supra note 13.
16 See Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99
ETHICS 229, 238-39 (1989); McClain, supra note 3, at 1206-09.
17 See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 83-84 (1997). West emphasizes the
severe consequences of this assumption for women. She warns:
The many women and the occasional man who define themselves as not-
selves suffer a decreased sense of personal autonomy, of independence,
of individuation, and of integrity. There is no reason to celebrate these
stunted selves whose very existence is dramatic evidence of massive
societal injustice, by misconstruing the selflessness they exemplify as the
virtue of compassion.
Id. at 83.
18 As Okin herself points out, Rawls acknowledged reproductive work as socially
necessary only very late in his career. See Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An
Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1563 (2004); see also John Rawls, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999).
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tends, and avows the bonds, relations, dependencies, and connections that
sustain and nourish human life."' 19
The second strand of the agency critique concerns itself less with
the constraints of relationship-the bonds of family and emotional
obligation-than with the more diffuse and subtle constraints of culture.
This critique begins from the assumption that cultural norms, including
language, law, custom, and morality, are not merely products of human will
and action but define and limit the possibilities for human identity.
20
Feminists have argued that this social construction of identity is gender-
differentiated, contributing to women's subordination. Thus, feminist social
constructionists are concerned not so much by the liberal preoccupation of
state limits on individuals (implying external constraints), but by the way a
combination of forces creates or defines gendered individuals (implying
both internal and external constraints).2' If women are socially constructed
in ways that afford them less agency relative to men, then liberalism's
tendency to regard liberty as the absence of external constraints (or, even
more narrowly, the absence of state-sponsored external constraints) leaves
women less free than men in ways that are not legally cognizable.22
Although this concept of internalized, socially-defined constraints
on women's identity has long been a part of feminist theorizing, 23 feminist
legal theorists in particular have focused on the question of freedom as it
19 BROWN, supra note 3, at 157.
20 See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 5 (2d. ed. 1990) (emphasizing social construction of identity and arguing that
"feminist critique ought also to understand how the category of 'women,' the subject of
feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which
emancipation is sought").
21 See, e.g., Nancy J. Hirschmann, Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom, 24 POL.
THEORY 46, 52 (1996) (suggesting that patriarchal rules constitute "not only... what women
are allowed to do but ... what they are allowed to be as well: how women are able to think
and conceive of themselves, what they can and should desire, what their preferences are").
22 See Higgins, supra note 12 (making a related argument that internal constraints
must be taken into account in any adequate theory of women's citizenship within a
democracy).
23 Even a liberal theorist like Mary Wollstonecraft recognized the significance of
social constraints on gender roles. She wrote: "I will venture to affirm, that a girl, whose
spirits have not been damped by inactivity, or innocence tainted by false shame, will always
be a romp, and the doll will never excite attention unless confinement allows her no
alternative." MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 129 (Miriam
Brody Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1982) (1792).
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relates to choice or voluntariness. For example, Kathryn Abrams has
developed a theory of partial agency in the context of women's sexuality
that has important implications for any definition of decisional autonomy.
24
Abrams argues for a feminist conception of the self that "juxtaposes
women's capacity for self-direction and resistance, on the one hand, with
often-internalized patriarchal constraint, on the other., 25 Abrams suggests
that premising legal analysis of private choice on this model of individual
agency would lead to better interpretations of women's sexual decision
making-for example, identifying coercion and consent in rape cases.
26
Adopting her approach, however, would also have implications for the
boundary between public and private because it entails scrutiny of the
circumstances and internal motivations of private choices ordinarily
shielded from view and invites a second-guessing of those choices that
would narrow the scope of women's decisional privacy as traditionally
defined. In short, the agency critique renders problematic reliance on the
concept of individual choice as a boundary for state regulation of the private
sphere.
B. Nussbaum's Response to Feminist Critiques
Professor Nussbaum responds to these feminist critiques of
liberalism in several ways. First, she notes that the claim that liberalism is
too "individualistic" disregards the importance that many liberal thinkers
assign to family and community. 27 At the same time, she concedes that
liberals do indeed regard the individual (not the family or the state) as the
primary unit for political thought.2 8 She suggests that this should be an
appealing idea for feminists, and notes that "when we reflect that a large
number of the world's women inhabit traditions that value women primarily
for the care they give to others rather than as ends, we have all the more
reason to insist that liberal individualism is good for women., 29 Yet the
feminist critique of liberalism can also be understood not as a rejection of
24 Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
25 Id. at 346.
26Seeid. at 361-62.
2 7 NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 61-62.
28 Id. at 62.
291 d. at 63.
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individualism as a normative commitment but rather as a challenge to it as a
descriptive claim. In other words, to the extent that women in fact function
less autonomously than men because of their greater connection to family
and especially to children, liberalism's protection of individual autonomy
primarily through the guarantee of negative liberties is less effective for
women than it is for men.
Professor Nussbaum concedes that this criticism may be valid but
suggests that it should be understood not as a critique of liberal
individualism, but rather as an argument that, with respect to the family,
liberalism has not been individualistic enough.3° In her view, liberal
thinkers can be rightly accused of paying too little attention to inequality
within the family. She notes: "Liberal thinkers tended to segment the
private from the public sphere, considering the public sphere to be the
sphere of individual rights and contractual arrangements, the family to be a
private sphere of love and comfort into which the state should not
meddle. ''31 In the interest of preserving private choice, Nussbaum concedes
that "too few questions were asked about whose choices were thereby
protected.,32 She therefore rejects liberal insulation of the family from state
regulation, seeing the family instead as a creature of state power and thus
fully open to criticism where it falls short as measured against her social
justice norms. 33
Professor Nussbaum also takes seriously feminist arguments that
socially constructed preferences are shaped by and reinforce gender
subordination, calling into question liberal definitions of freedom as the
individual realization of such preferences. Indeed, her capabilities approach
responds both to welfarist economic theory and related political conceptions
of autonomy by simultaneously offering an altemative means of measuring
human well-being and defining the pre-conditions for meaningful
autonomy. Put succinctly, Professor Nussbaum's approach asks not how
satisfied we are but rather what are we able to do and be? Or, as she
explains, "We ask not only about the person's satisfaction with what she
does, but about what she does, and what she is in a position to do (what her
30 id.
31 id.
32 NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 64.
33 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 241-97 (2000)




opportunities and liberties are), 3 4 as measured against a robust list of
human capabilities. 35 This move is critical to questions of gender equality
because, as Professor Nussbaum and others have shown, women may report
satisfaction with their condition even though they are demonstrably
materially, socially, and politically worse off than men, simply because they
are habituated to accept their status.36 This is an appealing approach for
feminists concerned about internalized constraint because it takes into
account not simply the problem of distorted preferences but also the ways in
which gender characterizes the distortions.
Although Professor Nussbaum takes preferences neither as fixed
nor as ultimately determinative of human well-being, autonomy and choice
are nevertheless central to her conception of justice.37 Normative though
they are, capabilities are really possibilities, not requirements, and
Nussbaum emphasizes the distinction between capabilities and
functioning.38 She warns, "[I]f we were to take functioning itself as the goal
of public policy, pushing citizens into functioning in a single determinate
manner, the liberal pluralist would rightly judge that we were precluding
many choices that citizens may make in accordance with their own
conceptions of the good."3 9 She adds, "The reason for proceeding in this
way is, quite simply, the respect we have for people and their choices." 40
But how can we determine whether an individual's choice to
eschew a certain form of human functioning is freely made? Under what
circumstances are we obliged to respect that choice? One of the things I like
most about Professor Nussbaum's work in this area is that she takes this
question very seriously. She acknowledges, "It will not always be easy to
say at what point someone is really capable of making a choice, especially
when there are traditional obstacles to functioning., 41 She adds that, in
" Id. at 71.
35 For Nussbaum's list, see id. at 78-80.
36 See id. at 119-47 (critiquing the concept of preference as a basis for measuring
human well-being).
37 See id. at 86-96 (discussing the distinction between functioning and capability).
381 Id. at 86-87.
391d. at 87.
40Id. at88.
41 See NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 49.
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some cases, "our best strategy may well be to look at actual functioning and
infer negative capability (tentatively) from its absence., 42 Indeed, she
concedes that "[i]f we judge that persistent inequalities or hierarchies may
have created emotional barriers to full participation, we may be justified in
using special incentives to encourage functioning, 'A3 though she thinks
these situations will be rare.
Professor Nussbaum thus helps us to address the question: What
conditions must obtain in women's lives before women's choices should be
regarded as binding, as entitled to respect under law? For her, the set of
preconditions is quite robust. It includes the existence of available
alternatives, education about those alternatives, and the absence of coercive
social norms that would preclude formally available nontraditional choices.
As Nussbaum explains, "[T]he capability view insists that choice is not pure
spontaneity, flourishing independently of material and social conditions. If
one cares about autonomy, then one must care about the rest of the form of
life that supports it and the material conditions that enable one to live that
form of life." 44
At this point, I will confess that Professor Nussbaum's work goes
further toward convincing me of the compatibility of feminism and (at least
some forms of) liberalism than does the work of almost any other theorist to
have addressed this set of questions. If liberalism is capacious enough to
contain Nussbaum's theory, it may be a comfortable place for me as well,
(though one might ask, somewhat tendentiously, whether we are still
recognizably in the domain of liberalism). The more important question I
have, though, and the one to which I will devote the balance of this essay, is
what policy guidance does Nussbaum's work give us in a world in which
women's capabilities fall far short of her ideal?
II. APPLYING THE THEORY
Like Professor Nussbaum, I have now spent a considerable amount
of time talking with women in the developing world, mostly in Africa,
about the conditions of their lives.45 In the course of this work, I have tried
421 Id. at 49.
43 See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 33, at 93.
44 See NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 50.
45 I have conducted field work on issues of gender and family in Ghana, Kenya,
South Africa, and Malawi. I have also interviewed women informally on these issues in
Tanzania, Senegal, Rwanda, and Botswana.
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to understand how the constraints of poverty, a lack of education, and
patriarchal family structures inform women's decision-making about their
lives and the lives of their children.46 As an outsider (living within her own
constraints, to be sure), I have come to accept that certain things about these
women's lives are and will remain opaque and impenetrable. At the same
time, I have also learned from this experience, and from Nussbaum, that
certain aspects of their condition may be more evident to me than to the
women themselves precisely because I am an outsider.
One thing that is clear to me is that women everywhere are
pragmatic. To be sure, they want more resources, more power and more
control over their lives. But, at the same time, they are realistic about their
circumstances and wary of change that might unsettle the existence they
have negotiated for themselves given the conditions under which they live.
Their choices, then, must be understood within the particular social context
in which they are made. Moreover, social policy and legal norms must be
fashioned in a way that accounts simultaneously for existing constraints and
for aspirations for gender justice. Nussbaum's capabilities approach gives
us a powerful way of defining these aspirations, though I have found it a
less clear guide to the formation of policy in a world in which gender justice
is far from a reality.
Let me illustrate with two examples. In many regions of sub-
Saharan Africa, customary law and social practices create complex
pressures and incentives for women confronted with domestic violence. In
the patrilineal and patrilocal communities with which I have worked, the
spouses reside in the husband's community and the children are regarded as
part of their father's family line.47 This arrangement increases a woman's
vulnerability to violence in a number of ways. First, all married women in
the community are outsiders in that they are not a part of the bloodline and
are therefore marginalized to some degree. 48 Yet, the first source from
46 See Jeanmaie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgins, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture,
and Women's Inheritance Rights in Ghana, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (2001); Mehlika
Hoodboy, Martin Flaherty, & Tracy E. Higgins, Exporting Despair: The Human Rights
Implications of Restriction on U.S. Health Care Funding in Kenya, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1
(2005); Tracy E. Higgins, Jeanmarie Fenrich, & Ziona Tanzer, Gender Equality and
Customary Marriage: Bargaining in the Shadow of Post-Apartheid Legal Pluralism, 30
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1653 (2007); Chi Mgbako, Jeanmarie Fenrich, & Tracy E. Higgins, And
We Will Still Live: Confronting Stigma and Discrimination Against Women Living with
HIVIAIDS in Malawi, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 528 (2008).
47 See TW BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 308-09 (2004)
(describing the patrilineal family and the affiliation of children with the husband's lineage).
48 Id.
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which a woman is expected to seek help in the event of violence is her
husband's family.49 Second, although she may find some measure of
security with his family, 50 if she chooses to leave his community, she must
leave her children and much of her property. 5' To complicate matters
further, even if she is willing to leave under these terms, her own family
may not welcome her back because they may be forced to return the lobolo,
or bridewealth, something they may be unwilling or unable to do.
52
In these communities, therefore, customary family structures
operate to disempower women economically, socially, and politically in
ways that are far-reaching, deeply-rooted, and complex. In cases of
domestic violence, these social structures create tremendous pressure for
women either to resolve matters within the family or to endure the abuse.53
Under such circumstances, women will not necessarily be able or even
willing to invoke available remedies for domestic violence. Thus, in our
interviews with NGOs working on domestic violence in South Africa and
with police charged with responding to such complaints, we learned that
49 See id. at 250.
50 One traditional leader, Chief Ngangomhlaba Mathanzima, the Head Chief of the
House of Traditional Leaders in Bisho, Eastern Cape, explained that the extended family will
discuss the matter and often recognize the problems. He suggested that the suspicion is often
on the man, who is encouraged to move out and leave the woman to care for the home and
children. Interview with Ngangomhlaba Mathanzima, Head Chief, House of Traditional
Leaders, in Bisho, S. Afr. (May 24, 2006) (notes on file with author).
51 This is generally the case unless the children are very young. If so, she may
leave with them, but must return them when they reach an appropriate age. For example, the
Subheadman of the Xhosa village of Ngcengane in the Eastern Cape, M. Similo, explained to
us that, if a woman leaves, she must leave the children with the man's family. If they are
very young, she may take them but must return them when they are older. Interview with M.
Similo, Subheadman, in Ngcengang, S. Aft. (May 26, 2006) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Similo Interview]. See also BENNETT, supra note 47, at 285 (noting that
"parental rights are determined by payment of lobolo [bridewealth]").
52 For example, in Ngcengane, Subheadman M. Similo explained the process for
the dissolution of marriage. He insisted that there was no divorce in his court. Rather, when
the woman decides to leave the man, the family of the woman must retrieve her. She then
stands naked outside the kraal of her family, where the cattle are kept, and must drive the
cattle from the kraal to return the lobolo. Similo Interview, supra note 51.
53 One of the members of the House of Traditional Leaders in Bisho, Eastern
Cape, explained to us that customary law is conciliatory. Even in the case of domestic
violence, the family will be brought together to settle the dispute. Interview with Nkosi T.
Magadla, Chief, House of Traditional Leaders, in Bisho, S. Afr. (May 24, 2006) (notes on
file with author).
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incidents are reported formally only in the most severe cases.54 The state's
legal mechanism for responding to domestic violence is rarely invoked,
even when an initial report is made.55 Women themselves reported that they
will not consider going to the police "unless there is blood., 56 Even then,
women will typically attempt to resolve the issue within the family
whenever possible.
I am not, of course, suggesting that women are not eager to be free
from domestic violence. On the contrary, safety is a critical issue for
African women, as it is for women everywhere. At the same time, women
do become habituated to violence, seeing it as a husband's prerogative to
discipline his wife. 57 Rather, the issue I am raising is some women's
apparent "preference" for traditional means of addressing the problem, such
as a preference for family mediation rather than police intervention or even
shelters.
Fashioning appropriate policy responses to domestic violence
therefore requires an understanding of the complex structure of patriarchy
in a given culture, including issues of educational inequality, economic
dependence, gendered religious and cultural norms, and hierarchical family
structures. It is never simply a matter of legal reform. Indeed, in the
communities with whom we worked, adding a civil cause of action to
existing remedies is not likely significantly to improve the situation of
women facing abuse.
If women themselves decline to utilize existing remedies (or even
resist state intervention in the family or community), what then is the
appropriate policy response? Further investigation sometimes reveals
obstacles that have nothing to do with culture or with choice: hostility or
insensitivity on the part of police, the necessity (real or perceived) of paying
54 See Interview with N.P. Ngum, Captain, in Coffee Bay, Eastern Cape, S. Afr.
(May 27, 2006) (notes on file with author) (explaining that most cases of domestic violence
are not reported and, if they are reported, charges are not pursued by the accuser).
55 See id. (noting that occasionally an order of protection is sought, but the victim
almost never pursues the case, and the man is almost never prosecuted).
56 See Interview with Anonymous, Member of ANC Women's League, in
Makhado, S. Afr. (May 26, 2006) (explaining that "if he beats me too much and there's
blood, I go straight to the police").
57 For example, Lungiswa Mamela, a woman working at the Women's Centre in
Khyelitsha, explained that women must simply endure the abuse. Indeed, women are taught
to expect a certain level of abuse as a condition of marriage. Interview with Lungiswa
Mamela, Women's Centre, in Khyelitsha, Cape Town, S. Afr. (May 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Mamela Interivew].
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bribes, the lack of the minimum resources necessary to access support
services, etc.58 Yet, even assuming these obstacles can be overcome,
Professor Nussbaum's capabilities approach presses us to consider the
impact that women's subordination has, not just on the scope of available
alternatives, but also on women's willingness to take advantage of those
alternatives. From a justice perspective, we cannot be satisfied with
removing external obstacles and noting that, if women choose not to access
available remedies, their decision to rely on traditional means must be
respected. That choice is meaningful only if women in fact are fully free to
choose from a range of alternatives, including exit from the community.
What the capabilities approach does less well, I think, is guide us as
to what to do in the meantime. Until we can be confident that women
experience themselves as having meaningful alternatives in this context,
how do we respond to the problem of domestic violence? Some policy
choices are easier than others. For example, educational efforts aimed at
local leaders may be somewhat effective in curtailing domestic violence and
would not seem to entail much of a trade-off between liberty and equality.
Though state efforts to persuade local communities to promote gender
equality by voluntarily reorganizing traditional structures would, for some
liberals, (though not, I think, for Professor Nussbaum), violate liberal
neutrality toward competing conceptions of the good.59 The state might be
even more aggressive, for example, by imposing civil liability on local
leaders for failure to refer domestic violence cases to the police or by
implementing mandatory arrest policies. The state might also alter the terms
of the underlying family structure, redefining child custody norms to ensure
that a woman fleeing domestic violence need not choose between her safety
and her children. Law reform efforts might also target the issue of lobolo,
providing that in cases of spousal abuse, it need not be returned.6°
58 See, e.g., Mamela Interview, supra note 57 (noting that women are told by
police, "Do you know what this will do to your marriage? We can give you the interdict but
where would you go? Look you have small children."); see also Interview with Linki
Maremana, in Ga-Matlala, South Africa (May 24, 2006) (The interviewee explains that "in
domestic violence cases if a woman goes to the chief, the first question is 'where are you
contributing to the headman or chief'? If no contribution, then they won't listen to your
case.").
59 See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 33, at 281
(expressing doubt about whether Rawls's commitment to neutrality regarding competing
conceptions of the good would permit government support for women's collectives).
60 See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 277-78 (describing conditions under which
lobolo need not be returned upon dissolution of marriage); Interview with Sibongile Ndashe,
Women's Legal Centre, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (May 28, 2006) (notes on file with author)
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These reform efforts, however, intrude substantially into the
domain of the traditional family structure and potentially alter the way that
structure functions to organize the social, political, and even spiritual life of
the community. Many South Africans, men and women, would resist such
intrusions; indeed, many see customary family structures as a source of
authentic African identity in the face of colonial oppression and in the wake
of apartheid.61 Moreover, it is at least possible that, in the short or even
medium term, destabilizing traditional family structures would increase
rather than decrease women's vulnerability to domestic violence.62 Thus,
we are left with the following question: In the face of resistance or
indifference, including from women, how aggressive should state policy be
in re-shaping family relations judged to disempower women? Moreover,
how far must the state go toward restructuring traditional communities in
the name of gender equality before we must respect women's choice to
remain located within such communities?
III. TAKING CHOICE SERIOUSLY
In the example of domestic violence, women's preferences are
inferred from their actions. Remedies are available, at least in theory. If
women do not make use of them, we either assume they prefer alternative
means of addressing the problem, or that obstacles remain such that the
(describing a case involving a king where domestic violence is being raised as a defense to
the return of lobolo after the dissolution of marriage) [hereinafter Ndashe Interview].
61 With respect to lobolo, or bridewealth, Bennett writes: "As an institution, lobolo
is central to the African conception of marriage." BENNETr, supra note 47, at 220. Bennett
describes lobolo's durability, "whatever its social, economic and political functions," noting
that it "has survived major transformations in the economy and society, not to mention the
determined onslaught of missionaries, colonial governments and the courts," although it has
changed "in form, composition, and function." Id. at 223 (citations omitted). "Whatever its
social and economic disadvantages, however, very few people would be prepared to support"
its abolition, as "[i]ts symbolic functions remain a powerful force" and "[e]qually important,
today, is its function to mark marriages as distinctively African." Id. at 224 (citations
omitted).
62 A male interviewee in one rural community expressly linked an increase in
family violence to the constitutional changes in South Africa. He explained, "It started in
1994, after the new government took over. Women have rights, children have fights, but men
do not have rights. The transformation of this government is the one that has made [domestic
violence] become worse. The government tried to remove them from their existing culture
and introduce them to new systems of life. After the rights were given to women and
children, this is when women started to disrespect the men." See Interview with Ngcengane
Community, in Eastern Cape, S. Afr. (May 26, 2006) (notes on file with author).
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remedies ought not be regarded as available in a meaningful sense. In other
contexts, it may be possible to structure law reform efforts more explicitly
around the goal of ensuring that autonomous choices are made. If law can
ensure a better process for informed decision-making, individual choices in
favor of hierarchy over equality can be respected and given legal force
without undermining a commitment to equal citizenship in the public
domain-or so the theory goes.
Another example from South Africa illustrates the difficulties with
this approach. The South African Constitution to some degree sets up a
conflict between equality and tradition by giving both protected status. For
example, Section 30 provides: "Everyone has the right to use the language
and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising
these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the
Bill of Rights. 63 Section 31 adds: "Persons belonging to a cultural,
religious, or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other
members of that community (a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion
and use their language. ,,64 Subsection (2) limits this right by requiring
that such rights "may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any
provision of the Bill of Rights"; 65 however, the degree to which private
ordering within a community implicates the Bill of Rights is unclear.
66
Finally, to complicate matters further, Section 211(3) states that "[t]he
courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the
Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary
law. 67
The statutory and common law regulating the family in South
Africa (both legacies of colonialism) are informed by liberal individualism
as described above. Within certain bounds, individuals are imagined as able
contractually to define what the family relationship might look like as it
pertains to obligations between spouses, the economic consequences of the
63 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 30.
64 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 30(1).
65 The extent to which the Bill of Rights applies directly to relations between
private citizens is a subject of some dispute. See, e.g., Du Plessis & Others v. De Klerk &
Another, 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.) (interpreting the interim constitution and denying
"horizontal" application). Nevertheless, section 9, the provision on discrimination clearly
demands "horizontal" application and prohibits unfair discrimination on the basis of gender,
age or sex by one person against another person. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9.
66 S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 211.
67 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 30, 31, 211.
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marital relationship (through the use of prenuptial agreements), and
inheritance (making a will rather than relying on the rules of intestate
succession). Although originally characterized by gender inequality,
common law norms have been subject to statutory reforms equalizing the
status of men and women in marriage, divorce, custody, and inheritance.
68
In contrast, in the domain of customary law, the family is
constructed very differently. If the family is considered one of the building
blocks of society in the West, this is even more profoundly the case in
traditional African communities. We might say that the family itself gives
rise to legal and political power and that these are a product of kinship ties,
not the reverse. 69 For example, the creation of nuclear families is not seen
primarily as the union of two individuals, but rather as the linking of two
families or clans.70 Cattle and land are at stake as well as the lineage. In this
68 See SA Law Commission Project 15, The Matrimonial Property Law with
Special Reference to the Matrimonial Affairs Act, 1953, the Status of the Married Woman,
and the Law of Succession in so far as it affects the Spouses (1982) (describing changes to
rectify gender inequality in laws of marriages but exempting customary marriage).
69 See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 294-95. Describing differences in African and
Western conceptions of the family, Bennett writes: "The common law and customary law
hold widely differing views as to when legal personality begins and ends. The common law
is prepared to attribute rights to a child, even unborn, whereas customary law would consider
survival at birth a minimum condition. On the question of death, the positions are reversed.
According to the common law, physical death marks the termination of personality, whereas
in customary law death is not an instant event that is measured physically." Id.
Bennett adds:
Although customary law is not insensitive to the vulnerability of
children, they are not chosen for preferential treatment, as is the case in
Western legal systems. Rather, customary law realistically appreciates
that their welfare is inseparable from that of their families. It follows
that, in the short term, children may be required to sacrifice their
interests for what, in the long term, will be the common good. ...
Whenever social life depends on mutual support and sharing, the risk of
conflict between the individual and the group is minimized by
underplaying individual interests.
Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted). A system of succession, for example, has as one of its
functions "to preserve the purity of a family's bloodline. Thus, children who are biologically
related to a deceased are preferred to those whose relationship is only social or legal." Id. at
315 (citations omitted).
70 See id. at 217. Bennett explains that "[c]ustomary marriage is not completed by
the performance of a single act nor does it need the approval of a public authority. Instead, it
can best be described as a (potentially lengthy) process that affects only the spouses and their
families ... [for the Tswana], this process begins with a series of meetings between two
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sense, family formation is a political and legal act that has potentially broad
implications. The particulars of this act are therefore not understood as
properly under the control of the individuals who form the marital couple,
but rather under the control of the extended family and community.
71
Moreover, both generational and gender hierarchy characterize the idealized
family under customary law, with parents and other elders exercising
considerable control over younger family members and men exercising
control over women.
2
These two systems, the common law and the customary law, can
coexist within a constitutional regime premised on equality only by
"civilizing" customary law through the liberal palliative of individual
choice. In other words, insofar as the family is regarded by the dominant
liberal-legal culture as a domain that can (and should) be organized
privately, customary family structures can be treated as legitimate (from a
constitutional standpoint) if voluntarily entered. If individuals choose to
embrace customary law within the privacy of the family, the argument goes,
the patriarchal character of that law does not create a problem for public
norms of equality.
This compromise is evident in South Africa's Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act ("RCMA"), legislation intended to incorporate
customary marriages into the formal regulatory sphere of family law.73 By
families at which they negotiate terms .... Go-betweens and family elders are always
available to testify to the celebration of a marriage, and the status of the union will be a
matter of general repute, since members of the community have witnessed the negotiations,
the wedding ceremony and the delivery of lobolo." Id. (citations omitted).
71 See id., at 180-81. Bennett notes that "the vertical extension of the nuclear
family, in the form of eponymous, patrilineal clans, is still prevalent today. Currently,
however, these units serve few functions, apart from determining a permissible range of
marriage partners. Clans normally segment into more manageable units-lineages-which are
generally four to six generations deep." Id. (citations omitted).
" Id. at 248. ("The term 'patriarchy' signifies the authority and the range of special
rights and privileges enjoyed by senior males. By implication, all women, as well as junior
men, are subordinate. Patriarchal societies are remarkably common, and, in precolonial
times, they were present in all parts of southern Africa.").
73 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. The Act responds to the
longstanding refusal of colonial and apartheid regimes to recognize fully marriages
celebrated under African customary law. To this end, the Act recognizes two types of
customary marriages: those valid under customary law and existing prior to passage of the
RCMA, and those entered into subsequent to the passage of the RCMA that comply with the
Act's requirements. See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, § 2(1)-(2).
The Act also explicitly recognizes polygamous customary marriages, and does not subject
customary matrimonial law to a repugnancy clause. Id. at § 2(3)-(4).
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expanding recognition of customary marriages, the RCMA improved the
status of women in these marriages by allowing married women and
widows to protect their legal rights and ensure that their spouses and in-
laws meet their legal obligations. Yet the Act also grants legal sanction to
an institution that is highly patriarchal, not least because these marriages are
all potentially polygynous and many actually SO.74 The RCMA attempts to
mitigate this problem by ensuring that the participants enter the marriage by
choice and, to a lesser degree, by regulating the institution directly to make
it somewhat more egalitarian. For example, the Act makes the consent of
the parties themselves (as opposed to their families) a necessary element of
customary marriage.75 Additionally, the statute establishes a minimum age
requirement for the parties to marry, though, with the parents' consent, the
minimum age can be waived.76 The statute also alters, formally at least, the
terms upon which the individuals may exit the marriage by providing for
dissolution of customary marriages on the same terms as civil marriages,
including "irretrievable breakdown" or "no-fault." 77
Where custom operates most comprehensively, it also defines status
and relationships within the broader family and community, including
governance structures and informal procedures for the allocation of land,
for the determination of inheritance rights, and for dispute resolution more
broadly.7 s Choosing between customary marriage and civil marriage is
therefore not simply a matter of choosing the set of legal obligations that
attach to the marital relationship. Rather, opting out of customary marriage
means exiting the larger social system that is comprehensively structured by
74 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, § 3(1)(a)(ii).
75 Id. Importantly, though, the Act does not require the consent of a first wife to the
husband's decision marry other wives. The Act requires notice to existing wives and the
partition of marital property, but not consent.
76 Id. at § 3(3)(a).
17 Id. at § 8(1)-(2).
78 See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 164, explaining
The absence of fully centralized state structures in most precolonial
African societies meant that courts could not force litigants to accept the
win-or-lose decisions associated with adjudication. Instead, the courts
tended to mediate or arbitrate, thereby seeking to reconcile the disputing




Columbia Journal of Gender and Law [Vol. 19:1
customary law. Indeed, whatever the formal requirements of the RCMA,
the decision to enter customary marriage often does not rest with the
individuals themselves. 79 Rather, male members of the two families
negotiate the terms of the marriage, sometimes without the knowledge of
the individuals involved.80 The transaction is in part an economic one, with
significant bridewealth or lobolo paid by the groom's family to the bride's
family. 81 In return, the groom's family secures the labor of the wife as part
of their community and in support of their household.82 Conflicts within
marriage are mediated within the larger family and the community with an
emphasis on reconciliation. 83 If the wife leaves her husband, she must leave
the community, including her children (who, in patrilineal societies, are
regarded as part of the father's family), and her own family may be
compelled to return the lobolo payment.
84
79 See id. Bennett notes, "A father's control over the marriages of his children is
synonymous with the African cultural tradition. Hence, in the official version of customary
law, the consent of a father, especially the bride's father, is regarded as an essential
ingredient of a valid marriage." Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
80 See id. Bennett notes that "[t]raditionally, customary law treated marriage as an
agreement between families, to be negotiated by senior males and sealed by payment of
lobolo. Strictly speaking, the consent of the spouses, especially the bride, was irrelevant." Id.
at 199, 204 (citations omitted).
81 A "typical contemporary explanation for the practice" involves compensating
the loss of a daughter which in large part includes "the expenditure on her upbringing and
education" to the bride's family. Id. at 224. Nevertheless, it also reflects an economic
transaction between the families that constrains entry into marriage as well as the terms of
the marriage itself.
82 See Id. at 213. According to all the systems of customary law in South Africa,
marriage is patri- or virilocal. In other words, a bride is expected to live with her husband,
either at his own or his father's homestead.
83 We heard this repeatedly in our interviews with women and traditional leaders
throughout South Africa. Almost universally we heard that first the family attempted to
resolve the issue, then it might be taken before traditional leaders. Police or magistrates
courts would become involved only in extreme cases.
84 See BENNETT, supra note 47, at 277. Bennett continues:
Although the full amount is seldom given back, return of at least some is
an important token of dissolution of the marriage. To this end, the
husband could demand the same cattle that he had originally given.
Depending on the extent to which the parties had fulfilled their marital
obligations, however, the wife's guardian may retain a certain portion.
The first criterion for determining how much might be retained is related
to the main purpose of marriage: procreation. Thus, a guardian is entitled
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Under these circumstances, regarding an individual's decision to
enter and remain in a customary marriage as signifying an expression of
individual autonomy seems deeply problematic. Of course, this point is not
lost on women in South Africa, particularly women who are in the vanguard
of women's rights. For example, Sibongile Ndashe of the Women's Legal
Centre in Cape Town observes:
To say because I belong to a particular group, that [1] have agreed
not to have certain fundamental rights applicable to [me] is
wrong. I find myself in this situation that I was born into, that I
married into. People need to be able to get out when they wish to.
Women are given one job, one choice. if they can articulate [their
choice], 'I like being here, I'm more comfortable here,' okay. My
problem is that everyone who is similarly situated should be able
to leave it. That is the promise of the constitution. If that is your
respect, your dignity, your choice at an individual level, fine, but
the broader constitution is promising you can remove yourself.85
Here, Ms. Ndashe speaks the language of liberalism-individual
choice and self-determination are essential components of freedom. Indeed,
she acknowledges that this may sometimes entail respecting the choices of
women to remain in hierarchical relationships in the name of tradition or
cultural authenticity. Yet, Ndashe qualifies the point in the same way that
Nussbaum does: Women's choices should be respected, but only if those
choices are meaningful.
The RCMA fails in this regard. It recognizes-and constitutionally
rationalizes-customary marriages despite their patriarchal structure by
building into the statute rather weak procedural guarantees of consent. The
statute leaves in place all of the social and economic constraints on
women's actual choices. At the same time, women are not necessarily made
better off by a state's refusal to recognize customary marriage. If prior to
the passage of the RCMA, women were left without a way to enforce even
the meager protections of customary marriage in the case of widowhood or
divorce, perhaps the RCMA is better than nothing. The danger, of course, is
that the half step helps to reify the traditional power structure by sanitizing
to keep one head of cattle for every child born by his daughter. This rule
holds good even for miscarriages, and even for children fathered by men
other than the husband.
Id. at 277 n. 103 (citations omitted).
85 Ndashe interview, supra note 60.
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it in constitutional terms. The compromise then relieves political pressure
for more radical change.
The better idea, of course, would be to ensure meaningful choice
for women at the time they enter marriage. Yet, even if one could figure out
how to accomplish this, the result might be such a thorough transformation
of traditional families and communities that there would be no customary
arrangement left to choose. I am not uncomfortable with this result, and
perhaps neither is Professor Nussbaum, but I suspect many liberals would
be.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the end of the day, I sympathize with the need to expand the
scope of women's choices and control over their lives and resources, even,
as Ndashe eloquently reminds us, while honoring those choices with which
I might disagree. At the same time, I worry about the ease with which
liberal regimes (even very progressive ones) rely on the formal mechanism
of individual choice as a means of rationalizing traditional systems with
legal and constitutional commitments to gender equality.
However difficult we find the equality/autonomy dilemma at the
level of policy, Professor Nussbaum always reminds us to keep in mind
women's capacity to alter their life plans and to remake their aspirations as
circumstances change. Ms. Ndashe similarly expressed this insight in the
interview previously quoted. She recalled, "Women walked around [Jacob]
Zuma's trial with signs saying 'No Women Presidents.' 86 Wondering why,
she observed:
When you're ready to remove yourself that is the ideal. [But]
they need the certainty that something else will be able to protect
them. Is equality going to put food on my table? That's the power
of the mind-all sorts of factors collude. The social and the
cultural are more compelling than the economic and
constitutional. This must be understood. They collude to put
women in a space that is not comfortable. 87
Finally, Ms. Ndashe notes that, although these women must be
understood and respected as they are, their opportunities must always be
preserved: "It is very important that they always be given the chance to say
86 Ndashe interview, supra note 60.
87 Id.
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this does not work for me. Those women with the signs at Zuma's trial can
come back next month and be a candidate for presidency."
88
88 Id.

